INTERACTIVE ROLES OF KNOWLEDGE AND
STRATEGIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZED SORTING AND RECALL

Michelene T. H. Chi

Learning Research and Development Center
University of Pittsburgh


The research reported herein was presented at the Thinking and Learning Skills Conference, sponsored by the National Institute of Education (NIE), and held at the Learning Research and Development Center, October, 1989. This research was supported by LRRC, funded in part as a research and development center by NIE, United States Department of Education. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of NIE and no official endorsement should be inferred. The author is also grateful for funds provided by the Spencer Foundation in support of this research. Susan Chipman's comments improved this paper immeasurably. Comments and editing by Mary Beth Curtis and Ernest Roes are also greatly appreciated.
This paper addresses the issue of how existing knowledge in semantic memory affects children's use of cognitive strategies. Briefly, it is proposed here that strategy usage is not a simple matter of whether a given cognitive strategy is or is not available to and usable by the child depending on his stage of maturation. Instead, the use of a given cognitive strategy is conceived of as having a complex interaction with the amount and structure of the content knowledge to which the strategy is to be applied. Such a view questions the role of maturation per se in the acquisition of strategies. It suggests instead the possibility that maturation is correlated, but not causally related, to the rate at which more knowledge is acquired, and that it is the acquisition of this knowledge that facilitates the acquisition and use of strategies. Some empirical data that begin to demonstrate such an interaction will be presented.

The fact that both knowledge and strategies (and their interaction) are discussed here implies that they are two separate components. Whether that is actually true is probably an academic question and the debate about their distinction is unresolved at present (see Winograd, 1975, for a discussion). Nevertheless, in order to make some sense of the current developmental literature, it seems reasonable to assume, at least as a working hypothesis, that (domain) knowledge and strategies are separable and distinct.

We begin by describing a very robust developmental finding -- the absence of organization in the young child's recall output. Typically in the past this has been attributed mainly to a strategic deficiency in the young child. It is hypothesized that the child fails to organize the inputs for proper storage so that retrieval often fails to show any
systematicity in the recall outputs.

**Absence of organization**

In a typical free recall task, a list of items is presented, and the subject is asked to recall them in any order he wishes. The sequence in which the items are recalled may reveal the organization that the subject imposes on the stimulus items. Hence, the fact that the order of the output sequence does not match the order of the input sequence suggests that some rearrangement of the input has been made by the subject so that the stimuli may be more compatible with some existing internal organization.

The presence of organization in the output is assessed by several measures such as category clustering or subjective organization. For simplicity, this paper will focus mostly on category clustering. The adult data show, in general, that when items belonging to different categories (such as, Clothing, Furniture, Vehicles) are randomly presented to an adult subject, the recall sequence will manifest clustering of items belonging to the same category (Mandler, 1967; Tulving, 1962). Young children, on the other hand, are not as likely to show strong category clustering (Bousfield, 1953; Cole, Frankel, & Sharp, 1971; Laurence, 1966; Nelson, 1969; Shapiro & Moely, 1971), and this tendency to cluster increases with age (Mandler & Stephens, 1967; Vaughan, 1968). Furthermore, this increase in clustering correlates with the general increases in the amount recalled with increasing age (Bousfield, Esterson & Whitmarsh, 1958; Cole, Frankel, & Sharp, 1971; Horowitz, 1969; Lange, 1978; Lange & Jackson, 1974; Liberty & Ornstein, 1973; Moely, Olson, Halwes, & Flavell, 1969; Nestick, Slotnick, & Ulrich, 1971; Shultz, Charness, & Berman, 1966; Rossi, 1964; Vaughan, 1968).

Although there is a general correlation between the amount of recall and the amount of clustering in both adults and children, it is not clear that the correlations denote the same kind of relations for children and adults. First, the number of categories present in the stimulus list does not affect recall developmentally, as it does in adults (Mandler & Stephens, 1967). That is, for adults, an increase (up to 7) number of categories into which the stimulus set can be divided produces an increasing number of items recalled (Mandler, 1967; whereas this has not been a consistent finding in children (Mandler & Stephens, 1967; Worden, 1975). Second, first graders can recall unrelated items even when the subjective organization scores are low (Rosner, 1974). Finally, it has been possible to obtain clustering in even the youngest children (ages 2-3, Rossi & Rossi, 1965). Hence, the relevance of the relation between amount of clustering and amount of recall is tenuous at best. Therefore, it is simply not clear that young children’s low amount of recall is caused by an inefficient strategy of organizing the inputs.

Nevertheless, the absence of category clustering per se in young children’s recall output is real, and can be further confirmed by the failure to form taxonomic categories in sorting tasks. Taxonomic categories generally refer to a category hierarchy, whereby basic objects such as chairs and tables can be grouped into the superordinate category, “Furniture” (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). This level of organization is the one most commonly probed in the experimental paradigm, but the hierarchy can also include a lower
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level in which subordinate objects (such as rocking chair and captain's chair) can be grouped into the basic level category, "Chair."

Young children, when asked to form groups of basic objects, typically do not do so taxonomically. That is, they do not group together basic objects from the same superordinate category. Instead, children tend to group things for a variety of other reasons, such as on the basis of perceptual similarity (Melkman, Tversky, & Baratz, 1981; Tomkawa & Dodd, 1981), concrete situations (Goldman & Levine, 1963; Olver & Hornsby, 1965), association and so on.

Their sorting categories are also smaller, more fragmented, and often constructed with different items, different sorting criteria, and presumably different conceptual properties than those of adults and older children (Goldman & Levine, 1963; Lange & Hultsch, 1970; Liberty & Ornstein, 1973; Saltz & Sigel, 1967; Saltz, Soller, & Sigel, 1972). Furthermore, even if children do form taxonomic categories, they are not often exhaustive; that is, they do not include all the items on the list in a given category (Annett, 1959; Flavell, 1970). Thus, they divide a set into more categories, with a smaller number of items in each category (Lange & Jackson, 1974; Worden, 1974). Also, the younger children tend to take a longer time to reach a consistent sort than the older children, suggesting that the bases of their organization are less stable.

Although it is not at all clear that there is a simple relation between categorization of the stimuli during sorting and clustering during recall, the two measures have been attributed to the same underlying deficiency, namely that children lack abstract classification principles. In fact, there may actually be a very tenuous relation between the two measures, as will be seen later in Study Three.

**Availability of Knowledge and the Structure of Categories**

In attempting to understand the absence of strong categories clustering and the deficiency in taxonomic sorting in children, natural questions to raise are whether categorical knowledge available to children in the first place, and whether the structure children's categories are adequately developed to allow categorical organization to be present in the recall and sorting outputs.

That categorical knowledge is available to young children for this research area. This conclusion is based on a variety of techniques used to assess categorical knowledge. In the majority of the cases, assessment of categorical knowledge is conducted by using supplementary tasks in conjunction with the primary task of sorting or free recall. Liberty and Ornstein (1973), in a post-questioning task, asked four graders to group "things that go together." Although these children did not initially cluster their recall outputs, they were able to "things that go together." This is taken as evidence that they do have some knowledge of the semantic relations among the items, but only the older children used this knowledge to organize their recall. Thus, interpretation was one of production deficiency. Kobasigawa and Middleton (1972) also indicated that young children have explicit knowledge of taxonomic categories by asking subjects in the post-trial interview to identify the six pictures (out of 24) that belonged to each of four categories. None of the children (even the kindergarteners) any difficulty doing this even though their clustering and recall scores...
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That categorical knowledge is available to young children for the stimulus material tested is the general consensus among investigators in this research area. This conclusion is based on a variety of techniques used to assess categorical knowledge. In the majority of the cases, assessment of categorical knowledge is conducted by using supplementary tasks in conjunction with the primary task of sorting or free recall. Liberty and Ornstein (1973), in a post-questioning task, asked fourth graders to group “things that go together.” Although these children did not initially cluster their recall outputs, they were able to “put things that go together.” This is taken as evidence that they do have knowledge of the semantic relations among the items, but only the older children used this knowledge to organize their recall. Thus, the interpretation was one of production deficiency. Kobasigawa and Middleton (1972) also indicated that young children have explicit knowledge of taxonomic categories by asking subjects in the post-test interview to identify the six pictures (out of 24) that belonged to each of four categories. None of the children (even the kindergarteners) had any difficulty doing this even though their clustering and recall scores
were significantly worse than the fifth graders. This is again taken as evidence for the availability of the knowledge which is not used for the purpose of recall or clustering.

In other cases, the research goal was to directly assess the structure and content of children's categorical knowledge. The evidence accumulated so far indicates that the structure of children's categories is fundamentally the same as adults, except that they may be more restricted. That is, children do have basically the same categories and the same set of "core" or "typical" items. What may differ is the extent and size of the categories. The category boundaries of young children may be more restricted and less well-defined. Several studies support this conclusion. Using a recognition procedure, Saltz, Soller, and Sigel (1972) asked children to select exemplars of categories from a large set of pictures. Exemplars that were picked by 75% of the children were considered to be the "core" members, which are basically the "typical" members of a category. The basic finding was that the younger children's core members are a subset of older children's core members. Using a sentence verification procedure to examine children's category structure, Rosch (cited in Mervis, 1980) asked subjects to indicate the truth of sentences such as, "A dog is an animal." Both children and adults were faster at responding to such sentences if the instance was a typical exemplar than if it was not. Furthermore, children made a greater number of errors in verifying atypical instances, suggesting that children have already learned the good but not the poor exemplars. Similarly, using a production task, Nelson (1974) asked children to generate instances of a superordinate category such as "Animals." Again, 5- and 8-year-olds generated predominantly the same set of core items, except that the younger children produced (1) fewer exemplars for each category, (2) more inappropriate instances of a category, and (3) a more limited set of core items than adults (Kooser & Hayes, 1977).

In sum, it seems fairly safe to conclude that young children have knowledge of categories and their members, except that category members are more limited in number, the core items are restricted, and the boundaries are less well-defined.

Discrepancy Between the Availability of Knowledge and the Absence of Organization

How does one resolve the discrepancy between the apparent availability of categorical knowledge in young children, the apparent similarity in the categorical structures of children and adults, and children's failure to use this knowledge in their clustering output? There are two ways to interpret this discrepancy. First, in the case studies in which one assesses knowledge directly (such as the post-questioning task), the instruction is usually not explicit that what is tapped is a specific set of links between two concepts and necessarily the entire hierarchical or categorical structure. For example, to be able to answer the question, "Is a robin a bird?" correctly, all one needs is the existence of a link between robin and bird; this does not necessarily imply that robin is embedded in a category in some hierarchical way. This distinction will be pointed out more explicitly in Study One, below (also see Chi, in press). In other cases where children are asked to put things that go together is also suggested here that this is not a legitimate way to assess semantic relations (see Study Four below). Thus, the point of
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first interpretation is to deny the conclusion that the necessary
categorical knowledge is always there on the basis of the way it has
been assessed.

A second way to resolve the apparent discrepancy is to accept the
assumption that young children do have categorical structures much like
older children’s and adults’, as is shown in the studies cited above,
except that the central members of young children’s categories are fewer
than the older children’s and adults’. If this premise is true, then we
should be able to find evidence which shows that when the stimulus
material used in the recall tasks is the more central members of the
category, then young children’s sorting and clustering scores are
elevated.

Five kinds of experimental paradigm can provide this type of
evidence. First, many studies which were done prior to the work on
Roch’s notion of typical members, manipulated the stimulus materials in
terms of high and low associates, or good and poor exemplars, rather
than typicality. If one makes the assumption that high associates are,
more or less, the central members of a category, then the evidence does
show that clustering occurs even in very young children (Corsale, 1978;
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members of categories. Again, if one makes a similar assumption that
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Finally, if one directly manipulates the typicality of the members,
one should find that “core” members of a category should be easier
to recall than the more peripheral members. Bjorklund and Ornstein
(1981) did find that, for the typical members, the clustering scores
were higher than for the less typical members. The results of Meier
and Jeffrey (1974), using lists constructed to contain highly cohesive
versus uncohesive members of the same category may be interpreted in
the same way. Six-year-olds had better recall and greater organization
of the cohesive members. (Study Three, hence, may be interpreted in
the same way.) Likewise, Northrop (1974) found that a list containing
easy-to-sort items was better recalled and organized than a list
containing items that were difficult to sort into categories. Both
cohesive and the easy-to-sort members correspond fairly closely
to Nelson’s (1974) “core” category exemplars. Finally, a fourth kind
of manipulation asks children to sort subordinate category members (e.g.,
chair and captain’s chair) into the “basic” level category (“chair”).
Again, young children can do this quite successfully for natural (Kripke,
et al. 1976) and artificial categories (Horton & Markman, 1980).

In sum, the evidence seems fairly persuasive that there really is
no discrepancy (between the availability of categorical knowledge in
clustering) if we consider recall and clustering for “core” members
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category members is really there in their knowledge structure in a form
that is truly comparable to adults. Hence, the issue is not one of availability/accessibility, rather, the suggestion is that children’s knowledge is usually not in the form that we have assumed it to be.

Acquisition of Specific Rules versus Knowledge Reorganization

The foregoing discussion has basically attributed children’s deficiency in organization and recall to a deficiency in their knowledge base and, in particular, the representation of that knowledge. In contrast, the interpretation in the literature puts more emphasis on a deficiency in the organizational strategy (at input and/or output). That is, the interpretation centers on the children’s failure to impose an organization on the incoming stimuli so that retrieval can be facilitated by such an organization. Because the interpretation is based on strategic deficiency, the literature on categorized recall has not recognized that a discrepancy exists between the availability of categorical knowledge and the absence of organization in recall, as is pointed out here. The basic assumption has been that the needed knowledge of categories is there, and absence of clustering during recall is a function of the deficient organizational strategy.

The focus on an interpretation based on strategic deficiency (rather than an inability to perceive organization due to a lack of structure in semantic memory) is evident in the emergence of abundant training studies which teach children to actively use an organizational strategy. In recall clustering tasks, most of the training studies take the form of inducing children to notice the categories, such as, by blocking the stimulus presentation (Moely & Shapiro, 1971) or providing names or labels for the categories (Nelson, 1969). These indirect training procedures have produced disappointing results. Providing labels or blocking the stimulus presentation often does not lead to greater conceptual organization on the part of younger children.

Direct training procedures where children were taught to (1) sort the items into taxonomic categories, (2) label the categories, (3) count the members of each category, and then further (4) organize recall remembering each category, did increase the amount of clustering children when the same stimuli were used for both training and subsequent recall tasks (Moely, Uilen, Halves, & Flavell, 1969; Worden, 1975). However, such improvements were again not dramatic when a different set of stimuli was used for the recall task (Moely & Jeffery, 1974). Such results permit two interpretations. First, the training could have produced context- or domain-specific rules. These rules were not generalizable to other contexts. Second, the training could reorganized the representation of the stimuli used in training so that the categorical structure of these stimuli would then be apparent during subsequent presentations. But again, such training would not be generalizable because stimuli in other domains have not undergone representational reorganization.

To elucidate the difference in the foregoing interpretation (acquisition of specific rules versus reorganization of representation), it is perhaps instructive to see how modern cognitive theories of knowledge representation can help us understand these phenomena. Knowledge is often separated into two types: facts and rules. Factual knowledge is knowledge that we know and can talk about, such as, the fact that “a robin is an animal.” Rule knowledge is knowledge about how one does something. For example, doing
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division requires a set of rules, which if followed properly, can produce the answer to a division problem.

Differences between facts and rules can be captured by the form of a production system. A production system is a network of nodes and links. Each node in the network can be conceived of as a concept, and the links denote the relations among the nodes. A variety of node-link network structures has been proposed, beginning with Collins and Quillian's (1969) hierarchical network model. In this model, knowledge such as "a robin is an animal" is stored as two separate propositions. There are direct (isa) links between robin and bird and bird and animal, but no direct link between robin and animal. Hence, in order to verify the truth or falsity of a statement such as "a robin is an animal," an inference must be made.

The assumption is that concepts are organized hierarchically with non-redundant storage of properties. General properties of robins that are common to all birds are stored at the most general (bird) node, whereas properties specific to robins are stored directly with robin. Hence, a robin is inferred to fly, sing, lay eggs, and so on (because these are properties true of all birds), whereas no inference needs to be made to retrieve the proposition that "a robin has red breast" (because red breast is a specific property attached to robins).

Hence, one could postulate that a canonical (and perhaps adult-like) representation is one in which the more general concept (BIRD) subsumes more specific concepts (such as Robin and Sparrow), and that clustering of all types of birds into the BIRD category necessitates a hierarchical representation in memory in which specific birds (Robin and Sparrow and so on) are subsumed under the BIRD concept node. Thus, the reorganization interpretation provided earlier specifies that perhaps a child's original representation of concept knowledge does not conform to a canonical one such as this, but training could then induce this new representation, thus producing results that are more consistent with adult performance because the representation is more adult-like. On the other hand, training fails to generalize to other domains since the representations of the other domains have not undergone any reorganization. The first study in this paper makes the point that children's initial representation of factual knowledge may not conform to one that an adult expects. Nevertheless, the performance variability can be understood in terms of its correspondences to the representation that exists.

Knowledge of rules, on the other hand, can be represented using a formalism of a production system. A production system is simply a set of rules, each rule having a condition and an action side. The condition side of the rule specifies the conditions, which must be satisfied, before the actions can take place. The conditions must match the contents of working memory. For example, we can represent an organizational strategy as a rule, which takes a set of inputs and looks for their similarities. If the conditions are met, then the action is to group them together for storage. Thus, subsequent recall would simply retrieve the stimuli (in clusters) that have been stored in the group.

Suppose the strategic deficiency interpretation assumes that what is lacking in the child is a rule that seeks categorical relations among the inputs, which may take the form:
vision requires a set of rules, which if followed properly, can achieve the answer to a division problem.

Differences between facts and rules can be captured by the formalism one uses to represent them. Factual knowledge is typically represented by an interrelated network of nodes and links. The nodes be conceived of as concepts, and the links denote the relations among the nodes. A variety of node-link network structures has been posed, beginning with Collins and Quillian’s (1969) hierarchical model. In this model, knowledge such as, "a robin is an animal" stored as two separate propositions. There are direct (isa) links between robin and bird and bird and animal, but no direct link between in and animal. Hence, in order to verify the truth or falsity of a statement such as "a robin is an animal," an inference must be made. The assumption is that concepts are organized hierarchically with redundant storage of properties. General properties of robins that are common to all birds are stored at the most general (bird) node, whereas properties specific to robins are stored directly with robin. Hence, a robin is inferred to fly, sing, lay eggs, and so on (because these are properties true of all birds), whereas no inference needs to be made to retrieve the proposition that "a robin has a red breast" (because breast is a specific property attached to robins).

Hence, one could postulate that a canonical (and perhaps adult-like) representation is one in which the more general concept (BIRD) subsumes more specific concepts (such as Robin and Sparrow), and that clustering of all types of birds into the BIRD category constitutes a hierarchical representation in memory in which specific instances (Robin and Sparrow and so on) are subsumed under the BIRD concept node. Thus, the reorganization interpretation provided earlier specifies that perhaps a child’s original representation of conceptual knowledge does not conform to a canonical one such as this, but training could then induce this new representation, thus producing results that are more consistent with adult performance because the representation is more adult-like. On the other hand, training fails to generalize to other domains since the representations of the other domains have not undergone any reorganization. The first study in this paper makes the point that children’s initial representation of factual knowledge need not conform to one that an adult expects. Nevertheless, their performance variability can be understood in terms of its correspondence to the representation that exists.

Knowledge of rules, on the other hand, can be represented using the formalism of a production system. A production system is simply a set of rules, each rule having a condition and an action side. The condition side of the rule specifies the conditions, which must be satisfied, before the actions can take place. The conditions must match the contents of working memory. For example, we can represent an organizational strategy as a rule, which takes a set of inputs and looks for their similarities. If the conditions are met, then the action is to group them together for storage. Thus, subsequent recall would then simply retrieve the stimuli (in clusters) that have been stored in a group.

Suppose the strategic deficiency interpretation assumes that what is lacking in the child is a rule that seeks categorical relations among the inputs, which may take the form:
Rule I:

If the two successively presented words come from the same category,

THEN tag them as similar, store them together, and retrieve them together.

The problem with such a rule, however, is that, in order for it to take effect, the condition side of the rule must be satisfied by matching the incoming information with patterns in semantic memory. In order to decide whether Robin and Sparrow (the two successively presented words) come from the same category, one must out of necessity have Robin and Sparrow in the semantic network and associated in such a way that their categorical structure becomes apparent. Thus, the success of applying such a general rule rests on the existence of an appropriate semantic representation, one that has the concepts organized according to salient dimensions (as in the canonical form).

The reason we postulate that training succeeds in producing clustering is that it sometimes induces specific rules, and not general ones. The nature of specific rules is that the condition sides of the rules spell out very specifically the similarities that are being sought. When these are presented in the stimulus context of the experiment, the child recognizes them, but in other more general contexts, the child fails to use the learned rule, not because the child fails to apply it (a production deficiency interpretation), but because in a different context, the conditions of the specific rule no longer match the new context.

To illustrate, suppose the child is told (or trained) to find group all the birds. The child can select all the birds (such as robin, sparrow, parrot, canary) out of a list of pictures containing other items (such as sofa, chair, bed, coat, gloves, etc.). There are two reasons why a child can easily do this task. First, as was stated above, being able to recognize that robin, sparrow, parrot and canary each individually is a bird, does not imply that they are represented in the canonical form. (Study One, below, will provide the evidence.) Second, young children can, even without any knowledge of birds, pick out all the birds on the basis of perceptual similarity. (Evidence will be provided in Study Four below.) Hence, once children have been taught to group the birds together, they may form a specific rule such as:

Rule II:

If sparrow, robin, canary, and parrot are presented,

THEN tag them as similar, store them together, and retrieve them together.

The acquisition of such a rule would of course not be generalizable. Furthermore, the acquisition of such a rule may also be fleeting for at least two reasons. First, the rule itself may have been well-learned to be maintained over time. Second, the act of the rule, "storing them together," also implies that a temporary representation may be created which involves the storage of these birds in a cluster. Again, new or temporary representations may not last, can be rather unstable. Both of these interpretations are consistent with the findings in the literature about children's failure to maintain trained strategies. Notice that if a child already has in memo
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canonical representation of birds, then the actions of Rule I would be redundant. Hence, older children’s learning of such a rule would be less susceptible to decay, and more amenable to generalization (that is, the acquisition of Rule I), assuming that older children would more likely have the canonical representation.

Study One, below, illustrates several things. The first is that a child need not have the canonical representation that adults usually think is the best. But that does not mean that children do not have a robust representation of some kind that they can and do work with. The second point is that we need not have a canonical representation in order to recognize that certain concepts are of a specific type. However, this knowledge need not imply that certain concepts are then subsumed under their type in a hierarchical manner.

**Study One: Exploring a Child’s Knowledge of Friends**

The goal of this study was to explore a child’s representation of a specific overlearned domain and then examine the relationship between the representation the child had and how that representation affected classification. In order to elicit a child’s knowledge of a domain (classmates), a 5-year-old girl (M.C.) was asked to generate all her classmate’s names. The results of four separate trials are shown in Figure 1. A majority of the 23 names was generated on every trial, and the retrieved order shows a fair amount of regularity. Groups of two, three, and even four children appear across trials and tend to appear in the same location on each list. One measure of the stability of organization of these lists, at the level of pairs, is Nelson’s (1969) Repeated Pairs Index (RPI). The value of the RPI for the present data

of one subject is .44. By contrast, 5-year-olds in Nelson’s (1969) study of free recall of lists achieved average RPIs in the range about .2 to .25. Although we are comparing two different studies, Bjorklund and Zeman (in press) have gathered data which permit a direct comparison to corroborate this point. They found first graders’ clustering scores with classmates to be around .51, whereas the second graders’ clustering scores on a standard taxonomic list of items was in the range of .10.

Insert Figure 1 about here

The reason for such a stable organization became apparent when M.C. was asked to sort 23 cards with the name of one classmate on each card. She completed the task in about 3 minutes and made four groups. Post-questioning revealed that her reason for this grouping was that each corresponded to the seating arrangement in class. Consultation with the teacher confirmed that this was true and the actual plan is shown in Figure 2. (It has since been shown by Bjorklund and Zeman, in progress, that this is a very popular way for children to represent their classmates.) The partitions of the lists in Figure 2 correspond to the groups. Clearly, M.C. generated the lists section by section. After four trials, only one instance occurred in which a boundary was crossed before the entire section was generated (Trial 1), and in that instance she corrected herself later and inserted the two missing names. (Note that this finding contrasts sharply with that in the literature showing that young children are often not exhaustive in their inclusion of
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the items on the list into a given category. One may now interpret that finding by assuming that children are smaller; hence, they appear to be nonexhaustive by the adults’ standard.)

Insert Figure 2 about here

Another way to test the reality of these sections is to look at the inter-item pause times. On the average, over the four trials, the times were 6.5 seconds between sections, whereas within-section times were 3.1 seconds. We also asked for recall after the child had sorted the names, since recall (as opposed to generation) is the standard procedure used to tap output organization. The set of 23 classmates’ names was presented in random order and then she was asked to recall them. The retrieval (which was perfect) produced the same kind of ordering, with more uniform pause times. Between-section times were 2.7 seconds, and within-section times averaged 2.4 seconds.

Although M.C. did not use the kind of taxonomic categories to organize classmates that seem salient to an adult, such as age, grade (this was a mixed classroom containing first and second graders), gender and race, it seemed highly unlikely that she did not know these attributes for each individual classmate. To test how this knowledge might be organized, two further tasks were conducted. The first was to generate the names of classmates with certain attributes, such as second-grade boys or all of the girls. Over eight trials, utilizing different subgroups of classmates, M.C.’s section by section organization remained stable. All members of a subgroup were named in one section before she moved on to the next. The second task was to confirm whether a given child was of the stated gender, e.g., “Andrew is a girl.” The latencies for this task were measured from audio tapes, there were no systematic differences among the times it took to verify that a child was of a given gender or not. Although measuring response latencies from aural tapes may not be that sensitive, the data were systematic in that a positive confirmation (correct gender) was faster (913 msec) than a negation (942 msec). This is consistent with data in the literature on confirmation and negation (Wason, 1959).

To summarize, the three specific results were: (1) the classmate names were generated by seating sections; (2) specific subgroups also generated in this way; and (3) it took equivalent amounts of time to verify the gender of any given child. The first two results indicated that M.C.’s grouping by section was quite stable over time and robust under different task demands; indeed, these results were obtained in four trials of free generation, one sorting trial, two free recall trials, plus various other tasks, spread over six sessions. Thus it seems possible to conclude, consistent with the hypothesis proposed here, that the top level, followed by Sections as superordinate nodes, Names as basic levels nodes and Attributes at the lowest level linked to basic node (see Fig. 3). The third result confirms this picture in the following way: Suppose the representation was one in which all girls were grouped under a Girl node. Rosch’s (1978) results would indicate that a category verification task should produce differentials since there were 13 girls in the class and not all of them could be central members of the Girl category. However, the absence
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time differentials in verification suggests that the task required the activation of nodes to the same depth in a hierarchy as the network (depicted in Figure 3) indicates. To confirm that a named child was or was not a girl required the activation of the child node and his/her gender.

In sum, this study illustrates that the preferred mode of representation for a child is not taxonomic in the adult sense; that is, it need not conform to an adult experimenter's conception of the ideal canonical representation, which may organize a classroom of children according to grade, gender, or race. Nevertheless, the child's representation, consisting of children with their seating locations, constitutes a valid representation which permits an orderly and high level of recall, a finding that is also supported by Bjorklund and Zeman's (in press) data.

The second point of this study was to show that certain attributes of a concept (such as the gender of a child), may be known and, yet, this does not imply that the concept is organized around that attribute as the dominant or salient dimension. This is the point made several times earlier in this paper. Thus, assessing that a child knows that "Mallory is a girl" (or "A robin is a bird") cannot lead to the conclusion that the child possesses a canonical representation, with the more inclusive category at the higher level node. It can only suggest that the specific link between the two concepts is present. This is it is postulated here that one must assess the larger integration knowledge structure, rather than the piecemeal links, in order ascertain that children know something.

Study Two: The application of an alphabetization strategy to the retrieval of friends.

In Study One, it was shown that M.C. had a very strong representation of her classmates, and that she retrieved those names using a representation based on seating arrangement. It was postulated that the representation was very robust because it was manifested every opportunity to retrieve those names. Thus, the conclusion was that the child retrieved the names in that particular order because that was how they were stored and represented in memory. The purpose of the study was to see if one could teach the child to use a strategy for retrieval that is not compatible with the way the names are represented, that is, in alphabetic order.

This study was motivated by the theoretical analyses presented earlier about the two possible conditions under which the teaching strategy succeeds in producing the desired performance. In the case, we postulated that in order for a strategy to take effect (I), the necessary factual knowledge must already be represented in a certain way. In this study, suppose the rule of recalling by alphabet order takes the form:
In sum, this study illustrates that the preferred mode of presentation for a child is not taxonomic in the adult sense; that it need not conform to an adult experimenter's conception of the canonical representation, which may organize a classroom of children according to grade, gender, or race. Nevertheless, the child's representation, consisting of children with their seating locations, constitutes a valid representation which permits an orderly and high level of recall, a finding that is also supported by Bjorklund and van's (in press) data.

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This study was motivated by the theoretical analyses presented earlier about the two possible conditions under which the teaching of a strategy succeeds in producing the desired performance. In the one case, we postulated that in order for a strategy to take effect (Rule 1), the necessary factual knowledge must already be represented in a certain way. In this study, suppose the rule of recalling by alphabetic order takes the form:
There was one interesting difference between the retrieval protocols of names in alphabetical order versus the retrieval according to the seating arrangement. In the latter case, retrieval occurred in quick succession, with 1 to 2 second intervals between names, and 5 second pauses between sections. In the former case, retrieval times for names within a given letter was around 2 to 3 seconds, but between letters ranged anywhere from 10 to 30 seconds. For example, it took 3 seconds to generate the name Emma after generating Dana, but only 1 second to then generate Eva and 3 seconds to then generate Eric. In fact, because it took her so long to generate the next letter, she often asked the experimenter what the next letter was, so that the experimenter began prompting her with the next letter when she paused. (This is not because she did not know the alphabet sequence.) What does this timing data suggest? It suggests that a new (and perhaps temporary) representation, much like that schematized in Figure 5, was created (or the existing representation was reorganized) while the subject was asked to sort the names according to the alphabet.

Training consisted of teaching the child how to alphabetize. She was asked to alphabetize the 23 names on cards. She was able to learn the rule in one trial, although she took a while to complete the trial. After that, she was asked to recall the names in alphabetical order. Surprisingly, she did so perfectly, although she often had to stop and ask what the next letter was in the alphabet.
IF two names start with the same letter,

THEN store them together, and retrieve them together.

If the child already has the names stored in alphabetic order (supposing a representation such as Fig. 4), then alphabetic retrieval is fairly automatic. The condition of the rule will always be satisfied.

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There was an additional difference between the retrieval protocols. In the alphabetical order, the child retrieved names in the order they were encoded. However, in the seating arrangement, she would often retrieve names in a different order, often starting with the names that were closest to her in the alphabet. This suggests that she was not retrieving names in a purely alphabetical order, but rather was using the seating arrangement as a cue for retrieval.

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With only one training trial, she only had time to create a representation with names grouped together by individual letters, but not in any specific (alphabetical) order. Hence, the alphabet list was used as a pointer to retrieve the "next" cluster, and it was difficult for her to keep track of her place on the alphabet list. Therefore, once a cluster of names beginning with the same letter was entered,
retrieval was fast. However, because this representation was not ordered in a specific (alphabetical) way, it took time to jump back and forth between retrieving the content of a cluster and finding the next location on the alphabet list.

The pattern of inter-item pause times is not consistent with the alternative interpretation, that names are searched during recall in alphabetical order according to the seating sections. That is, she did not search for all the A names in Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, then search for the B names in Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on. To do so would mean that she did not create a new representation, but used the existing one, and organized her recall during retrieval. One might expect recall to be achieved by this on-line method if the child had not already been asked to alphabetize the whole deck of 23 names. This initial training experience probably biased the whole organization to occur at input. The pattern of pause times suggests that recall was not on-line and supports the interpretation that one way that a strategy can be taught and used is when the child can create a new representation of her already familiar factual knowledge.

How successfully can a strategy be applied if a new representation cannot be easily formed? In order to test this hypothesis, the child was asked to memorize a list of names that had no immediate semantic references for her (at least not in a cohort group), even though she was familiar with each individual name. This is a matched set of 23 names with the same number of syllables and the same number of names beginning with the same letter. For example, instead of having Andrei, the new list had Anna. After three sort-recall trials, including one where the child was explicitly told to alphabetize the names, the child’s recall was still poor, about 11 out of 23 names, compared to the perfectly alphabetized recall of familiar names.

What this study demonstrates is that when the stimuli tested conform to a knowledge base that is very familiar and has a clear representation, a child seems to have no difficulty creating a new representation so that the new pattern of retrieval is consistent with the new representation. By this interpretation, the mechanism of retrieval operates by first changing the knowledge base (either creating a new one or rearranging the old one). This is more likely to be true here because retrieval followed sorting, which probably provided the opportunity to create a new representation that was more or less consistent with the alphabetization strategy. (A perfect representation would have been one where the clusters were sequenced alphabetically.) However, had she been asked to recall in alphabetical order without prior sorting, she might have had to retrieve the names in the alternative on-line mode, that is, searching for names with a given initial letter, section by section. Nevertheless, the finding that the child could readily recall in a different pattern for the classmates suggests that the use of a strategy greatly interacts with the knowledge base. When the conceptual knowledge is well-organized initially, a child can easily benefit from instruction on the use of new strategy. Otherwise, the utility of a new strategy is more limited, as in the case of alphabetical recall of familiar names that did not correspond to an existing organized representation.
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Now, successfully can a strategy be applied if a new representation has already been formed? In order to test this hypothesis, the child was asked to memorize a list of names that had no immediate semantic relations for her (at least not in a cohort group), even though she was familiar with each individual name. This is a matched set of 23 names with the same number of syllables and the same number of names beginning with the same letter. For example, instead of having Andrei, the new name was Anna. After three sort-recall trials, including one where the child was explicitly told to alphabetize the names, the child’s recall was still poor, about 11 out of 23 names, compared to the perfectly alphabetized recall of familiar names.

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Such data give one plausible interpretation for why training studies in the use of strategies often are not maintained over time. This study suggests that the new representation may be temporary. This data also has implications for interpreting why older children seem to benefit more from training. One possibility is that older children may have data bases analogous to this child's representation of classmate names — that is, organized; whereas younger children may have a knowledge base corresponding to this child's knowledge of a random list of familiar names that are not organized. In that case, the utility of the strategy was less apparent (this is what has been called a mediation deficiency).

**Study three: Classification of Dinosaurs**

Study One attempted to explain why a young child did not retrieve a set of concepts in a taxonomically organized way. Instead, the organization reflected one that was learned after one year's experience. The presence of strong organization and the impressive number of classmates retrieved, as opposed to the often found lack of any organization and poor retrieval in young children, may be attributed to the highly familiar nature of the stimuli. Deltosse and Smith (1979) also found preschoolers to be extremely accurate at recalling which one of the many companions they had played with the previous day and week; and Bjorklund and Zeman (in press) found superior recall of classmates by first, third and fifth graders as compared to recall of the standard taxonomic categories, such as Animals, Furniture, and so on.

The goal of the present study was to determine whether a child is capable of taxonomic organization, is familiar, and are represented in a taxonomic organization that may have hypothesized that such a representation which could have reorganized to the extent so that the relevant attributes

A 4 1/2-year-old child (M. K.) could be considered an expert since his parents had read dinosaurs. We proceeded to explore the knowledge was represented, and explored classification of dinosaurs.

In order to determine which one knew of each, we began by asking the production task, with the child dinosaurs he knew. Across the dinosaurs. From this, a set of When one dinosaur name elicited between them in memory. To determine dinosaurs, a clue game was used list of properties and the "guess these properties belonged. The experimenter and the child, the child's recognition and some links or relations.
Such data give one plausible interpretation for why training studies in the use of strategies often are not maintained over time. This study suggests that the new representation may be temporary. This data also has implications for interpreting why older children seem to benefit more from training. One possibility is that older children may have data bases analogous to this child's representation of classmate names—that is, organized; whereas younger children may have a knowledge base corresponding to this child's knowledge of a random list of familiar names that are not organized. In that case, the utility of the strategy was less apparent (this is what has been called a mediation deficiency).

**Study three: Classification of Dinosaurs**

Study One attempted to explain why a young child did not retrieve a set of concepts in a taxonomically organized way. Instead, the organization reflected one that was learned after one year's experience. The presence of strong organization and the impressive number of classmates retrieved, as opposed to the often found lack of any organization and poor retrieval in young children, may be attributed to the highly familiar nature of the stimuli. Delsolse and Smith (1979) also found preschoolers to be extremely accurate at recalling which one of the many companions they had played with the previous day and week; and Bjorklund and Zeman (in press) found superior recall of classmates by first, third and fifth graders as compared to recall of the standard taxonomic categories, such as Animals, Furniture, and so on.

The goal of the present study was more ambitious: to show that a child is capable of taxonomic classification if the stimuli are highly familiar, and are represented in memory such that they conform to a taxonomic organization that might be expected by adults. Again, it is hypothesized that such a representation is achieved through learning, which could have reorganized the earlier (more immature) representation so that the relevant attributes become the salient dimensions.

A 4 1/2-year-old child (M.K.) was studied intensively. This child could be considered an expert in the knowledge domain of dinosaurs, since his parents had read dinosaur books to him for about 1 1/2 years. We proceeded to explore the knowledge he had of dinosaurs, how that knowledge was represented, and how that representation affected his classification of dinosaurs. (For details see Chi & Koeske, in press).

In order to determine which dinosaurs the child knew and what he knew of each, we began by eliciting dinosaur names from him in a production task, with the child freely generating the names of the dinosaurs he knew. Across six sessions, he generated a total of 46 dinosaurs. From this, a set of 40 was selected for further testing. When one dinosaur name elicited another we assumed there was a link between them in memory. To determine what the child knew of the 40 dinosaurs, a clue game was played in which the "chooser" generated a list of properties and the "guesser" identified the dinosaur to which these properties belonged. By alternating roles between the experimenter and the child, the game provided information about the child's recognition and spontaneous generation of dinosaur-property links or relations.
The dinosaur-dinosaur linkages gathered in the production protocols and the dinosaur-property linkages derived from the clue game, were used to map a network representation of the total set of 40 dinosaurs. In order to simplify the network, we artificially segregated the 40 dinosaurs into two groups of 20 each; one set will be referred to as the better-known dinosaurs and the other as the lesser-known. The division was based on two external criteria: the frequency of inclusion in the child's nine dinosaur texts and the mother's independent judgment of the child's best- and least-known dinosaurs. Seven dinosaurs from each set of 20, (henceforth referred to as the targets), were selected for detailed analyses of their structure. The targets were chosen such that they were matched on the amount of information (number of properties) mentioned about each dinosaur. Focusing on a subset from each set of 20 was necessitated both by a theoretical reason and a methodological one. Had we analyzed the structure of the entire set of 20, the better-known set would have overwhelmed the lesser-known set in terms of the sheer number of properties known about each dinosaur. Theoretically, we were not interested in the quantity of information, but more in the structure of information, if we could hold quantity constant. The methodological reason was that there was greater frequency of probing of the better-known dinosaurs in the clue game, thus resulting in a sampling bias.

The two sets of 20 dinosaurs were also divided into seven categories each, corresponding more or less to the way these dinosaurs were introduced in the books. As it turned out, the better-known target dinosaurs fell into two of the seven categories: armored dinosaurs and large plant-eaters. The lesser-known target dinosaurs belonged to five of the seven categories: armored, small bird or egg eaters, water dwellers, duckbills, and early.

Basically, we want to suggest, better-structured, formed more links to target dinosaurs within- and lesser between-category and lesser-known dinosaurs. The dinosaurs were much more uniform. Third, when we subsequently presented dinosaurs, his recall outputs from these pre-defined categories, set.

Would the child's classification reflect the existence of the properties that sort the dinosaurs, he did so (with pauses) and into two groups. The sorting pattern was consistent, the sorting pattern did not correspond in his knowledge structure. He suggested that sorting and responding to the same underlying processes.
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Basically, we want to suggest that the better-known targets were better-structured, formed more cohesive groups in memory than the lesser-known targets, even though the same amount of information (five properties) was known about each target. This can be illustrated in the following ways. First, better-known target dinosaurs showed multiple links to target dinosaurs within the same category, but only single links to target dinosaurs of other categories. Second, target dinosaurs in the better-known portion of the network shared properties with target dinosaurs in the same category more often than with target dinosaurs from the other categories. Such a contrasting pattern of (greater within- and lesser between-category) linkages did not appear for the lesser-known dinosaurs. The connections for the lesser-known target dinosaurs were much more uniformly distributed among the categories. Third, when we subsequently measured his recall of the two sets of dinosaurs, his recall outputs manifested greater clustering according to these pre-defined categories in the better-known than the lesser-known set.

Would the child’s classification of the 20 better-known dinosaurs reflect the existence of these categories? When we asked the child to sort the dinosaurs, he did so very quickly (without hesitation or pauses) and into two groups: meat-eaters and plant-eaters. This sorting pattern was consistent across two separate trials. The child’s sorting pattern did not correspond entirely to the presumed categories in his knowledge structure. Hence, as was stated earlier, it is suggested that sorting and clustering should perhaps not be attributed to the same underlying processes, even though their deficiencies are
often correlated in young children.

Because we have argued that cohesive groups corresponding to categories existed (at least for the better-known dinosaurs) we could interpret this child's grouping data as evidence showing that he chose to use a higher level (or superordinate) relation to sort the dinosaurs. That is, one can assume that the representation can be schematized as in Figure 6, with every dinosaur fitting into one of the categories that we have postulated. Furthermore, the categories can be collapsed into higher level superordinate nodes, such as meat-eaters and plant-eaters. "Meat-eater" and "Plant-eater" were precisely the two abstract categories into which the "Animals" category was divided by Storm (1978). In her study, she found that third graders (about 9 years old) had difficulty sorting according to these abstract dimensions even after training. Our data would support the notion that a child can classify taxonomically if there is sufficient knowledge about the interconnections (or contingencies) to allow such groupings. Furthermore, his sorting performance is very adult-like in the sense of being fast, exhaustive, and stable across trials.

Second sort was land-meat-eaters, plant-eaters, and water-swimming. That is, he introduced two additional dimensions: habitat and locomotion. In his third sort, he changed it again into land-plant-eater, water-meat-eater, and water-plant-eater. His sorting performance matches those typically exhibited by young children -- slow, non-exhaustive, and inconsistent. An explanation for his inconsistencies is that the lesser-known dinosaurs are not as well-structured and cohesive as the better-known dinosaurs, in terms of our criteria for patterns of interlinkages within and between groups.

To summarize, this study illustrates that a very young child is capable of sorting at a superordinate level (food habits), one which has been found by zoologists to be basic to classifications of mammals. The ability to classify at this level is not often found in the literature even for 9-year-olds (Storm, 1978). This impressive sorting performance can be attributed to the well-organized and highly enriched representation that the child had of dinosaurs. The enriched, well-integrated, and coherent representation, at least for the better-known dinosaurs, was shown by the presence of multiple and interrelated links in a specific configuration. We hypothesize that such a well-formed representation came about from frequent exposures to dinosaurs, so that the relevant conceptual dimensions (food habits) became salient. This is why the lesser-known dinosaurs were not as well represented, and sorting performance was more variable (see Chi, in press).
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Insert Figure 6 about here

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Consistent with our interpretation that the grouping of the lesser-known dinosaurs are less cohesive, his sorting performance on the lesser-known dinosaurs was more variable. He could not reach a stable sort in three trials. His first sort was meat- versus plant-eaters, his second sort was land-meat-eaters, plant-eaters, and water-swimming. That is, he introduced two additional dimensions: habitat and locomotion. In his third sort, he changed it again into land-plant-eater, water-meat-eater, and water-plant-eater. His sorting performance matches those typically exhibited by young children — slow, non-exhaustive, and inconsistent. An explanation for his inconsistencies is that the lesser-known dinosaurs are not as well-structured and cohesive as the better-known dinosaurs, in terms of our criteria for patterns of interlinkages within and between groups.

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Study Four: Classification of Dinosaurs by Expert and Novice Children.

Study Three indicates that when a child is knowledgeable, he is capable of exhibiting taxonomic classification at an earlier age than has been traditionally found. Another way to examine the interaction of domain knowledge and the use of a particular classification principle is to compare and contrast expert and novice children's classification performance. The idea here is that if expert children classify in a different but more sophisticated way than novice children, then one could conclude that it is not the appearance in the children's repertoire of a classification principle (like a strategy) per se that makes the difference, but rather, the classification outcome is the interaction of a particular mode of retrieval with the representation of the domain knowledge.

A set of 20 dinosaurs that could be categorized into five groups was selected. Most of the categories were determined from books about dinosaurs, and they tend to have perceptual attributes that define their similarities. For example, a common category is the duckbill dinosaurs, because they all have a mouth that looks like a duck's bill. Children who knew a lot about dinosaurs, as well as children who had very little knowledge of dinosaurs, participated. They were each asked to do two tasks: (1) to tell everything they knew about a dinosaur, when a picture of it was presented, and (2) to classify the 20 dinosaurs and give explanations for their categories. Only the results of the second task will be discussed here.

The data from two experts and two novice children, mean age 7.2 years, will be presented. Expertise was determined by a post-hoc criterion: the number of dinosaurs out of 20 that a child could correctly identify by name. The two expert children each named 12 out of 20 correctly, whereas both the novices could not identify in correctly.

The sorting data are interesting in a variety of ways. First novices could group the dinosaurs according to the a priori categorization specification fairly accurately. For example, novice N.C. grouped the dinosaurs pretty much in the way specified, perhaps with one error. Novice N.R. had three groups. From scanning the data collected on other novices, it is fairly clear that children, without any explicit knowledge of the stimuli, can classify them based on their visual resemblance and visual similarities. This finding is consistent with both Rosch et al.'s (1976) results and Horton and Markman's (1980) results, in which they found that children can classify and easily acquire objects that are at the basic level, since, at that level, instances of the concept are relatively similar to each other. Hence, one could postulate that each individual dinosaur (see Figure 6) is an exemplar of the "basic" categories, such as the duckbills. Thus, based on Rosch et al.'s findings, it is not surprising that the novice children could sort the dinosaurs into their respective categories.

That the perceptual similarities are the basis of their classification can be further substantiated by examining children's explanations. Almost in every case, the reasons provided were perceptual in nature. For example, one of the novice's reasons for grouping the duckbills together was because their heads looked alike; they had small hands, rough skin, and so on.
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How are the sorting patterns of the experts different? We expected the categories to be salient (not only on a perceptual basis, but also because books tend to introduce them as a group) so that all the experts would also group them the same way. Surprisingly, the two experts grouped them pretty much the way the 4 1/2-year-old expert (M.K.) did from the previous study: plant-eaters and meat-eaters. One of the experts (A.P.) had an additional group, based on aggressiveness. There are two things to note about the experts’ data. First, they tended to group them according to more abstract than perceptual features. For example, they were grouped on the basis of the diet and/or whether they were mean or not. In Bosch et al.’s (1976) taxonomy, this would correspond to sorting at the superordinate level. Secondly, we further know that the groupings were based on a more superordinate node because when asked to further subdivide the large groups (meat- versus plant-eaters), both experts created subgroupings that looked very much like the novices’ initial groups (such as duckbills), and further were also based on perceptual features. Hence, the adult-like sorting according to superordinate level categories was observed in 7-year-old children who were experts in a knowledge domain. This suggests that the development of classification skill interacts strongly with knowledge about the stimulus domain.

Summary

This paper began by summarizing the developmental research of the last two decades which has shown the absence of organization in young children, particularly as exhibited in the recall output. This absence of clustering is in direct contrast to the apparent capabilities of young children to sort or categorize items into their taxonomic categories, when explicitly requested. This discrepancy has not been seen as such because the interpretation in the literature has centered on a strategic (or production) deficiency explanation. That is, it has been postulated that children have the requisite knowledge to organize the stimuli, but are simply not doing so. One of the points made in this paper is that one need not have any knowledge of the stimuli at all in order to sort them properly. This can be done on the basis of perceptual similarities, as shown in Study Four. Furthermore, one could also sort stimuli properly into their respective requested categories not because the knowledge is necessarily organized in a taxonomic way in memory, but because the explicit task demands often assess the presence of specific links and not the integrated knowledge structure, as shown in Study One.

Another way to explain the occasional success of young children at sorting and clustering can be understood by postulating that young children do have categorical knowledge much like adults’, only that their categories are smaller with a more restricted set of core or central members. Consequently, when an experiment uses a restricted set of central members as the stimuli, recall and clustering will be much improved. This is also shown in Studies One and Four.
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Finally, this paper makes the important point that whether young children manifest a performance that conforms to the use of a strategy may actually reflect how the content knowledge was stored and represented in memory. When the memory representation takes a certain format (as in Studies Two, Three, and Four), children will appear to be able to use a sophisticated strategy. When the content knowledge is not represented in a certain way, as when the child is asked to retrieve a set of names that did not belong to a cohort group (Study Two), or when a novice is asked to sort dinosaurs (Study Four), recall is more difficult, and does not manifest the use of a general strategy. Hence, the relationship between strategies and knowledge is necessarily an interdependent one.

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Reference Note

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Figure 1

Figure 2